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Summary. In many existing markets demanders wish to buy more than one unit 
from a group of identical units of a commodity. Often, the units are sold simul- 
taneously by auction. The vast majority of literature pertaining to the economics 
of auctions, however, considers environments in which demanders buy at most one 
object. In this paper we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of bidding 
strategies to be a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium to a uniform price 
sealed bid auction using the "first rejected bid pricing rule" in an independent private 
values environment with two-unit demands. In any symmetric monotone Bayes- 
Nash equilibrium, all bidders submit one bid equal to their higher valuation and 
one bid lower than their lower valuation. We characterize the equilibrium and 
derive the exact amount of underrevelation i  the lower bid. 
1. Introduction 
Auctions are used in every part of the world to transact rillions of dollars worth 
of objects every year. The omnipresence of auctions has certainly not gone 
unnoticed by economists who have generated a huge literature on the subject. Most 
of the literature focuses on environments where a single seller has one or more 
indivisible object(s) to be sold to multiple bidders, each of whom wants to buy at 
most one of the objects. In the first major paper on the subject, Vickrey (1961) 
introduces the second price sealed bid auction and its multi-unit generalization, 
the uniform price sealed bid auction with "first rejected bid" pricing. In an 
environment in which each demander independently draws one valuation, known 
only to her, from a distribution which is known to all demanders, these auctions 
* This article is based on chapter 2of the author's Ph.D. thesis. I would like to acknowledge the financial 
support of the Clarence Hicks Memorial Fellowship, the California Institute of Technology and the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory. I also thank D. Roderick Kiewiet, Richard McKelvey, Charles Plott, David 
Porter, Annemieke Tromp, participants in the Tinbergen Institute Seminar Series, an anonymous referee 
and especially John Ledyard for countless enlightening comments. 
338 c. Noussair 
are demand revealing. Each bidder has a dominant strategy to submit a bid equal 
to the value she has drawn. 
In most markets where auctions are currently used, however, it is common for 
buyers to wish to buy more than one unit of the commodity. If a demander wishes 
to and is permitted to purchase more than one unit, non-uniform pricing is required 
to induce demand revelation (Vickrey (1961), Forsythe and Isaac (1982), Weber 
(1983)). 2 The demand revealing auctions are quite complex and in many appli- 
cations the simplicity of a uniform pricing rule may be preferred or required. 
Assessing the consequences of using a uniform price auction and the resulting 
strategic behavior on the part of bidders requires an analysis of the equilibrium 
properties of the particular auction applied. Characterization of equilibria for a 
simple uniform price auction is thus the focus of this paper. 
In the next section we model a uniform price sealed bid auction with "first 
rejected bid" pricing in an independent private values environment with two-unit 
demands. In theorem 1, we list necessary conditions for a bidding rule to be a 
symmetric undominated strictly monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. In equili- 
brium, each demander bids his valuation for his higher-valued unit and less than 
his valuation for his lower-valued unit. The exact amount of underrevelation is 
derived in lemma 2. The bidding function must be separable, in the sense that 
each bidder's lower bid is independent of his higher valuation and vice-versa. In 
theorem 2, sufficient conditions for a bidding function satisfying the conditions of 
theorem 1 to be an equilibrium are given. 
2. The uniform price sealed bid auction 
In this section we consider the theoretical properties of a simple uniform price sealed 
bid auction within a two-unit demand independent private values environment. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a bidding function to be a symmetric 
monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium are derived, and an example is provided. 
2.1. The model 
Let there be k (> 1) identical units to be sold and n + 1 (> 1) demanders indexed by 
i = 1 . . . . .  n + 1. Each demander draws two valuations independently from a fixed 
and common distribution 7(v), where 7(v) has strictly positive density on [0, 6] c R + 
and 7(v)eC 2. Order the two values from higher to lower and index them 1 and 2 
respectively, so that vii > v~ _> 0 are the valuations of demander i. Define G(vil, v~) = 
Prob(vl < vil,v2 <_ v~), where vl and v2 are a pair of values independently drawn 
from 7(v). Let g(vl, v2) denote the probability density function of G. Since g is a joint 
density of order statistics drawn from a distribution with positive density on [0, 6], 
g(vl, v2) > 0 for all/)1,/32 such that 0 </)2 -</)1 "~ 6. All demanders are risk neutral. 
Valuations are private information but 7, n and k are common knowledge. 
1 Forsythe and Isaac (1982) show that the second price auction is the only demand revealing direct 
mechanism in the single-unit environment. 
2 All of the demand revealing auctions are variations of Groves mechanisms. 
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2.2. The game 
All demanders ubmit two non-negative bids. The highest k bids are accepted and 
the corresponding demanders pay a per-unit price equal to the k + 1 st highest bid. 
A tie for kth highest bid is broken by randomly allocating a unit to one of the tied 
demanders. A bid which is equal to zero is never accepted. 
3. Symmetric equilibria 
3.1. Necessary conditions 
In theorem 1 we derive a necessary condition for a bidding strategy to be a 
symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Let a bidding function, B(vl, v2) = 
(BI(vl,v2),B2"(Vl, V2)): [0,/~]2---->R 2+, map two valuations into two bids. Two 
definitions are required for the statement and proof  of the theorem. 
Definition 1. A bidding function, B(v 1, v2) is type M if: 
1) B(0,0) = (0,0), 
2) B is continuous in v t and v2, 
3) Bl(~,0>_ B2(~,~), 
4) 3 a function 0j(v:) such that Bj(v~, vj) = 0; iff vj <_ 0/(v:), for z :~j; z, je  1,2. 
5) c?Bj exists and is >0/ f  Bj > 0 and ~B_J exists and is >0;  z r  0. 
8vj Ov~ 
Definition 1 describes a notion of continuous monotonicity. B 1 and B 2 are 
monotone in both of their arguments and strictly monotone in one of them. 
However, 1) and 3) impose restrictions on the bidding function which make type 
M differ from more standard notions of monotonicity. The type M class allows 
bidding strategies which specify that Bj(vl, v2) = 0 for all v 1 _< 01 and v2 < 0 2, for 
any t~l~[0, g] and any ~2e[0, g]. It includes, as a special case, bidding functions 
which are strictly increasing in v I and v2 (where 0 = 02 = Vl). The important concept 
of separability is described in definition 2. 
Definition 2. A bidding function is separable if B(vl, v2) = (B~ (v 1), Bz(v2) ). That is, a 
demander's bid for his higher (lower) valued unit is independent of his lower (higher) 
valuation. 
We also introduce some additional notation, the functions H, T, and F, which are 
functions of order statistics that help make the statement and proof of theorems 1 
and 2 more concise. Let 
,, (fo:,fo )' H(z 1, z 2, G, m, n, l) = I!m!(n - m - l)! g(vl' v2)dv2dvl 
(;fo <f; g(Vl, v2)dv2dVl) m g(v 1, v2)dv2dvl . (1) 1 x~ 21 2 
The function H(-) is the probabil ity that in a sample of size n drawn from g(vl, v2), 
exactly I observations have the property that (v~ <_ z~, vz <_ z2), exactly m obser- 
vations have the property that (v~ > z~, v2 _< z2) and exactly n - m - 1 have the 
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property that (v~ > zl, 12  > Z2). Let 
T(zl ,zz,z3,G,n,k)= ~m,t;m+zz=2.-k+lH(Zl'Zz'n'm'l) 
2. /OH OH 1 "~" (2) 
+- -  ) Eq=2n--k+2Em,I;m+2l:q~oz1 Oz2 
The function T(-) describes the amount by which bidders underbid on their lower 
valued unit in a symmetric Type M equilibrium. Let 
(F  *(x){B) = Prob (at least v bids made by bidders other than i are less than or equal 
to x if all bidders except for bidder i use B). 
(F(i(x)[B) is defined for v = 0 . . . . .  2n. For v > 0, (F(i(x)[B) is the cumulative 
distribution function of the vth order statistic of bids made by n randomly chosen 
demanders using strategy B. Let f] i(x)]B denote the corresponding density 
function. 
Theorem 1. A bidding.['unction is a symmetric undominated type M Bayes Nash 
equilibrium only if it equals/~(/21'/22) = (fl1(/21' /22)' fi2(/21' /22))' where: 
fl~(/2x) =/2~ (3) 
and: 
where: 
{~--2 V2 -< V~ 
fi2(/22) = (/22) V 2_> V*, (4) 
v; = <n,k ) 
k Or2 
and fi2 solves the differential equation: 
with the initial conditions: 
(5) 
(6) 
v*=0;  if n>k-1  
fi2(0 = ~; i fn<k- l  
f i2 (0 )  = 0; q '  n = k - I .  (7)  
Theorem 1 is proven using lemmas 1 and 2, which are stated and proven in this 
subsection and lemmas 3 7 in the appendix. 
Lemma 1. I f  a bidding function f l (v l ,v2) :  (fll(Vl,V2),fl2(Vl,V2)), is a symmetric 
undominated type M Bayes-Nash equilibrium, then ill(v l) = v l. 
Proof: Suppose all n + 1 bidders are using the same equilibrium bidding function 
B*(vl, v2). For  notational ease, let F~ i*(x) = F~ i(x)[B*. Since B* is symmetric, V is 
common,  and valuations are drawn independently, F v-i*(x)= F~*(x)," Vi. Bidder i's 
expected profit is given in equation (8). 
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9 ( , , | i  . M * 
E~'= (v'l-- 2n-k+l)f2n-k+l(M2n-k+l)dM2n k+l
J~ 
i 
+ (v', +v~-2M2,  k+2)f* ,_k+2(M2,_k+2)dM2,_k+2 
+ (vii  - b~)(F*.~+ ,(b~)- F*._~+~(b~)). (8) 
where My is the vth lowest order statistic of bids made by bidders other than bidder 
i and b~ is thejth highest bid made by bidder i. The first term indicates the profit 
when the purchase price is between i's two bids, in which case the purchase price 
equals Mzn_k+ 1. The second term gives the profit when both of i's bids are 
accepted, in which event he obtains two units at a per-unit price of M2,_k+ 2 and 
the third term gives the profits when i's lower bid is the k + 1st highest, in which 
event he receives one unit and pays a per-unit price ofb~. In all other cases, i's profits 
equal 0. 
In equilibrium, bidder i's two bids, bil and b~, are chosen to maximize (8) subject 
to bil >_ O, bi2 >_ O. The first order necessary (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions are given in 
equations (9) and (10): 
63 E Tc i
Ob'l - -  - -b l ) f  2n_k+,, 
= (v; i , (bil) = O; b'~ > O, 
_< O; b', = O, (9) 
•ETr i 
9 i * i * i * b i i ab~ - (v '2 -b2) f  2" -k+2(b2) - (Fzn  k+l(bz)- -  Fzn-k+2( 2))=0; b2 >0, 
_<0; b~=O. (10) 
If .f*2n-k+l(bil)>O, then B* is separable and B~(v l )=v  1 for vl>0._ If 
f*2n-k+ l(bil) = O, then there can be more than one solution but any strategy is 
9 " - / i f  weakly dominated by B*(vl)  -= v 1. b' 1 < v'1 results is profits lower than bll  v 1
i and equal otherwise, be~ > vii results in profits to bidder i lower bil < M2,_k+ , <V 1 
than bl = ~i if v i < M2,_k+l < b{ and equal otherwise9 [] 
We have shown that in equilibrium, each bidder's higher bid equals his higher 
valuation. We derive the lower bid in lemmas 2-7. Lemma 2 contains the most 
important property of the lower bid, that it must satisfy the differential equation 
in (6), which describes the exact amount of strategic underbidding. The proof of 
lemmas 3-7 establish initial conditions and boundary values for equation (6). We 
cannot establish one initial condition that always holds. However, given the number 
of bidders and units sold, we can always derive one initial condition9 The differences 
are illustrated in figure 1. 
Figure 1 depicts the general form that flz(V2) may have. There are three possible 
cases. In the first case, in which the number of bidders if strictly less than the number 
of units being sold, that is, n < k - 1, it must be the case that fl207) = g. It is possible 
that v* > 0 and f12(v2) = 0 for all v 2 _< v~. In the second case, where n > k - 1, v* 
must equal 0. Thus f12(v2) is required to be strictly monotone at all values ofv  2 from 
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n<k-1 
(v 2 ) 
/w (~',~) v 2 (v2) B 
/ 
v v 
v 2 
n>k-1 
(v 2 ) 
/ 
/ /B  2(V2 ) 
/ 
0,0) v 
v 2 
n = k-1 
(o/1 ~/ i /2 (v2)  
Figure 1. f12(v2) under different values of n and k. 
0 to f. In the third case, when n = k - l, it must be the case that/~2(0) = 0. However 
o < vb  ~2(v~) = 0. v* may be strictly greater than 0 so that for all v 2 _ 
Lemma 2. I f  B* is a Type M undominated symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, then 
B*(vl, v2) = fiE(V2); where f12(v2) =/~2(v2); for v 2 >_ v~ and ff2(v2) solves." 
ff2(v2)= v~-T(~2(v2), v2, ~2), ~, n, k). 
_ i F* t(bi2)- F~,_k+2(b~2))/ Proof: The first order conditions require b~-  v 2 - (  2n-k+ 
, i f2n_k+z(b2) for any symmetric equilibrium bidding function B*. By lemma 10, 
f *  _k+ 2(b~) > 0 so the last expression isdefined. Since B* is being used by all players 
and B*(vl) = vl: 
Prob(v 1 < S~l*(b~)) = Prob(v 1 < b~). (11) 
Also, because ~?B~(v2) > 0 for v2 > 02 and B*(v2) = 0 for v 2 < v2: 
c~v 2
Prob (S*(v2) _< b~) = Prob (v 2 _< VE(b~z)), (12) 
where the function V2(x):[O,B*(~)] ~ Iv2, v], and V2(x ) = B21*(x). Consider the 
probability that a randomly drawn bidder, named y ~ i, submits 2 bids that are less 
than or equal to b~. The probability that two of y's bids are less than b~ is the 
probability of the following event: 
~V2(b2)~ b2 
_ i y_b~)= ~ .~o O(Vl,vz)dvldV2. (13) Prob (b~ < b 2, b 2 < 
Similarly, exactly one ofy's bids is less than or equal to b~ when either of the two 
following events occurs: 
f2'; > 32 , 32 <__ 32) = g(Vl, v2)dvldv2, (14) Prob (b~ i r i b~ 
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or  
_< b2, b 2 > b~) = g(vl,V2)dvldV 2. (15) 
2(b 2) 
The last expression equals 0 because it requires that (v~ ___ b~, v{ > V2(b~)), 
an event that occurs with probability zero; since * b ~ * (F2n k+l (  2 ) - -F2n  k+2(b/)))/ 
, i f2,_k+z(b2) >_ 0 (because the numerator is a probability and the denominator is a 
density), it must be the case that Vz(b~)>_ b~; but by assumption v] _> v~. The 
probability that demander y makes 0 bids less than or equal to b~ is given by: 
i y b2 ) g(vl,v2)dvldv2. (16) Prob (b] > b2, b 2 > = 
2G~ 
Suppose now that each of the n bidders other than bidder i draws one pair of 
valuations from G(v~, v2). Exactly l of the buyers make two bids less than or equal 
to b~, exactly m buyers make one, and exactly (n - m - l) bidders make zero bids 
less than or equal to b~. The probability of this event is given by: 
Prob (exactly 1 observations of  B*(vl i) < b~2, exactly m + I observations of 
B*(v2 i) <_ blz) 
= m--  L 9(va'v=)dvldv2) 
t !m!( .  - i ) ' . \ J o  
g(Vl, v2)dv 1 dv 2 9(Vl, v2)dv 1 dv2] . (17) 
wo "~b~ - -~v~G~ b'~ 
The previous expression equals H(b 2, Vz(bi2), G, n, m, l) where H is as defined in 
equation (1). It follows that: 
H(b 2, V2(b~), G, n, m, l), 
l,m;2l+m=2n-k+ 1 
2n 
F* i 2n_k+2(b2)) ~- ~ ~, U(b 2, V2(b~2),G,n,m, 1), (19) 
q=2n-k + 2 l,m;21+m=q 
(F'~n_k+ a(bi2) -- F~ b i _~+~(2)) = (18)  
and 
(< y 2 + (20) q=2n-k+2 l.m;2 m=q gV 2 gb~/]" 
The last three equations imply that: 
F* l - -2n -k+2(b2) ) / f2n -k+2(b2)=T(  (~22) '  ) ( 2,-k+ (b2) F* , . , b~,V2(b~z) ' OV2 -1 G,n,k . 
Since all bidders are using the same strategy, b~ must equal . i B 2 (v2). Therefore: 
(21) 
(22) 
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Using equations (10), (21) and (22), we see that equation (6) and the second part of 
equation (4) must hold. [] 
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof follows directly from lemmas 1-7. It has now 
been shown that B*(Vl, v2) is a type M undominated symmetric Bayes Nash equi- 
librium, only if it equals ft. [] 
There is underrevelation the lower-valued unit for the following reason: since 
there is positive probability that a demander's lower bid is the k + 1st highest, he 
has some incentive to underbid for it in order to lower the price he pays for the unit 
he receives (the fact that the lower bid is the k + 1st highest implies that the higher 
bid is among the k highest, and therefore the demander receives exactly one unit). 
There is no incentive to underbid on the higher-valued unit, since in the event hat 
the demander's higher bid is the k + 1st highest, he wins no units, and his profits 
are zero. Overbidding is always a dominated strategy. 
The two symmetric equilibrium bids are separable, indicating that the extent of 
underrevelation  the lower unit depends only upon the rank of the unit, the 
distribution of valuations, the number of bidders and the number of units sold, and 
is independent ofthe bidder's higher valuation and his higher bid. The independence 
results from the fact that the price paid is independent of the amount of the higher 
bid, and therefore the gains from lowering the final price depend only upon how 
many bids are accepted in the event hat the lower bid is the k + 1st highest. 
3.2. A simple example 
Suppose 7(v) is uniform on the interval from 0 to 1, n + 1 = 2 and k = 3. We know 
that ill(Vii)= vii in an undominated symmetric equilibrium. The calculation of 
f12(v2), which equals v~ - T(.), proceeds in the following manner. First note that 
n! 
- 1. Using the fact that v 1 _> v2, we can derive the following equation 
l Im!(n-m-1)! 
which gives the probability that a bidder makes exactly two bids less than or equal 
to b~: 
Jo g(v"v2)dvldV2 = Jo g(va'v2)dvldv2 = (b~)2" (23) 
The probability that a randomly chosen bidder makes exactly one bid less than or 
equal to b~ equals: 
fo v~(d~) f~ g(vl,vz)dv,dv2 = 2Va(b~)-(V2(bi2))  -(b~) 2. (24) 
b~ 
and again using v 1 >_ v 2, we can derive the probability that a randomly chosen 
bidder makes exactly zero bids that are less than or equal to b~. The probability is 
given by: 
fvf g(vl, v2)dvldv 2= g(vl, v2)dvldv2 = (1 - V2(b~)) 2. (25) 
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The numerator of T equals the following expression (note 2n - k + 1 = 0): 
E i i - -  V2(b2) ) . (26) H(b2, V2(b2),G(/),,/)z),n,m,l)=(1 i 2 
(m,l;m+ 2l= 2n-k  + l) 
Next, we derive the denominator of T. F2,_,+2(b~) equals (bi2)2+2V2(bi2)- 
(V2(b~)) 2 (b~) 2 and there fore f2 , _k+2(b2)=(2-2  ~ ' - V2(b2) V2(b2). Since the equili- 
brium is symmetric, V2(b~) =/)~2. The solutions to the first order necessary conditions 
b',=fil(/)l)=/)'~; b', > 0, 
>__tel; bil = 0, 
(1 - 2 
b~ = fi2(/)2) =/ )~ - (2 i , i '  - -  2/)2) V2(b 2) 
(1 - / ) i  )2 
9 _ 2 . 
->/)2 (2 i , i ' - 2v2) V2(b 2) 
b >0, 
are given by: 
(27) 
with the initial condition fl2(1 ) = 1 because n < k - 1. Solving for V2(b2)i we obtain" 
, i l i 
V2(b2) - - v2 (29) 
2(v~ -b2)"  
a solution can be found by setting b~ = (v2) 2 which implies that Vz(b~) = (b~) 1/2 and 
, I i  i~ - i  also that V 2 =~tv2) . We obtain: 
f l (Ul '  152) = (/)1' (/)2) 2) (30) 
3.3. Suffieient conditions 
In theorem 1 we provided necessary conditions for a bidding function to be a 
symmetric undominated Type M Bayes Nash equilibrium. In theorem 2 sufficient 
conditions are given for/3 to be an equilibrium. There are two conditions: A and B. 
Condit ion A insures that the appropriate second order conditions are satisfied; if 
all other demanders use fl, the payoff function of bidder i is concave in bidder i's 
strategy. Condit ion B insures that fl is type M. 
Condition A: /? satisfies Condit ion A if: 
q=2n-k+2 re,l;2 m=q 
2. 0 , ,  
*(W2(b2)- b2) < • Z - - -+  (31) 
q=2n-k+l  m,l;21+m=q ~b2 ~W 2 ~b2 ,] 
for all b 2 such that 0 _< b 2 _< ~ where W2(x):[0, fl2(g)] --* [/)*, f], W2(x ) = f121(x), 
where H = H(b2, W2(b2), G, n, m, l) 
Condition B: fl satisfies condition B if: 
1 - -  ~T/~/ )  2 
> 0; /72 > 0. (3"2) 
1 + aT~#~?2 
= 0,  (28)  
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Theorem 2. Suppose that fl satisfies (3)-(7) and conditions A and B. Under condi- 
tions A and B, the bidding function fl(vl, v2)= (ill(v l, v2), fl2(vl, v2)) is a symmetric 
undominated Type M Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: The theorem is proven in lemmas 8 and 9 in the appendix. [] 
It can be readily verified that the second order conditions hold for the example 
in the last subsection. 
4. Summary and concluding remarks 
We generalized some important theoretical properties of a uniform price sealed bid 
auction with "first rejected bid" pricing to an independent private values environ- 
ment with two-unit demands. We considered a class of bidding functions called 
type M, essentially a general type of continuous monotonicity. A necessary condition 
for a bidding function to be a type M symmetric undominated Bayes-Nash equili- 
brium was derived. The dominant strategy equilibrium of the single-unit demand 
environment results as a special case. In any equilibrium, there is underbidding for 
each demander's lower-valued unit, as demanders, even as they behave non- 
cooperatively, underreveal demand in an attempt to shift the market price in their 
favor. An interesting property of type M equilibria, separability, is also obtained. 
A sufficient condition for a solution to the necessary conditions to be an equilibrium 
is also deduced and an example of a type M equilibrium is provided. 
Clearly, intuition which follows only from knowledge of equilibrium properties 
of uniform price sealed bid auctions in the single-unit demand environment is not 
valid when considering multi-unit demand environments. Although this has been 
known for some time, this paper extends previous results by characterizing the 
precise xtent of strategic behavior in a simple uniform price auction in a multi-unit 
demand environment. 
A. Additional proofs 
Lemma 3. f12(/)~)=0; U~ = T(O,v*,O[3~,*),G,n,k). 
v "o'/~v2(~ Proof: Equation (10)implies that for b~ =0, 0>_ Vz(0)-T(0, 2 ( ) ,~-~h~-)  , 
\ - - -~2 / 
G, n, k). The inequality holds with equality if 1/2(0) = T 0, Vz(0 ), \~22 J , G, n, k , 
which implies that V2(0 ) = v~. [] 
Lemma 4. f12(v2) = 0; i f  v2 <- v*. 
Proof: Consider any v 2 < v~. Then 0 > v 2 - T 0, V2(0), G, n, k . By 
, , o  _ \ k, gb z ) ' equation (10), Bz(v2) - 0. [] 
Lemma5. v~=O; i fn>k-1 .  
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/ ~B~(v~) ) 
Proof :  Cons ider  v* = T |0 ,  v*, , G, n, k . By lemma 10, the denominator  of 
\ av2 
the last equat ion,  f~ ,  k+2(O) > O. If the numerator  is equal  to zero, it would  imply  
that v* = O. The numerator  is: 
n! 
E H(O, V:(O), G, n, m, I) = E 
l,m;2l +m- 2n-k + 1 l,m;21+m=2n-k + 1 l!m!(n -- m -- l)! 
o, ; 
* ",ao .JO g(vl'V2)dvedVl oo oO g(vl'V2)dvedVl 
?) ~ ) X n - m - l . 
(IOLo ,. 
The last express ion equals  0 unless l = 0. If I equals  0, the express ion equals: 
m!(n-  m)! g()dl)2du1 g(.)dv2dv I . (34) 
m=2n-k+l  kdo  ,dO / ' , dO dV2(O )
Since m_> 0, the last express ion equals  0 if n > k -1 .  Therefore,  v~ = 0 when 
n>k-1 .  [] 
Lemma 6. /~2(~) = tT; / f  n < k - -  1. 
Proof :  Cons ider  T(B~(~),  f, OB*(g), G ,n ,k ) .  The denominator  o fT  is posit ive by 
c3v 2 
lemma 10. If v~ = 15, the numerator  of T equals: 
n! 
E H(B~(~), ~, ~, ~, m, l) = E 
l,m;21+m=2n k+ 1 l ,m;2l+m=2n-k+ 1 l!m!(n - m - I)! 
* v lm 
* ( ; :2 (v ) f f f ,q ( l ) l , v2)d l )2du1) l t ; ; i (v ) , fog(V l ,V2)dv2dV l  
* (~  ~ tn  m 1 
\ J ,*2(e) 'j g(vl' V2)dv2dVl " (35) 
The prev ious  equat ion  equals  0 unless n = m + I. It also equals  0 unless 2l + m = 
2n - k + 1. n = m + l and 2l + m = 2n - k + 1 cannot  be satisf ied s imul taneous ly  if
n<k-1  s ince(21+m=2n-k+l )  ,~  (21+n- l=2n-k  + l) ~ ( l=n-k  + l). 
Since l>_ 0, it fol lows that  i fn < k -1 ,  T(B*(O) ,~ 8B*( f )G ,n ,k )  = 0 imply ing that  
B*(~) = ~. []  \ ' &2 ' 
] 
Lemma 7. /72(0 ) = 0;. i f  n = k - 1. 
a~(0) ) 
Proof: Def ine /~(0)  to be : /~(0)  = 0 - T 0,/3"(0), ~-v2 ,  G, n, k . The  numerator  
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of Tequals: 
n! 
H(B*(O),O,G,n,m,I)= Z 
l ,m;2 l+m=2n-k+ 1 l,m;2l+m=2n-k+ 1 l!m!(n -- m -- 1)! 
),(fo fo ; 0(/21, v2)dv2dv 1 g(vl,  v2)dv2dvl \ , J o  dO z(o) 
* O(vl, v2)dv2dvl . (36) 
~(o) o 
Equation (36) equals zero unless l = 0 and m = 0. If l = m = 0, (36) equals zero unless 
2n-k  + 1 equals zero. If 2n -  k + 1 =0,  then n r k -  1 if n >0.  Therefore, for 
,, n. ,m ,ie  that = 0 when n ~ 
k-  1. 6'v2 
\ - -  / 
Lemma 8. I f  condition B holds, fi is Type M. 
Proof: Suppose condition B holds. Clearly 3(0, 0) = (0, 0) and 3 is continuous in v 1 
and v2. ~1(v2) = 0, ~2(vl) = v* and 31(~, ~) = f > 32(~, 0- Since 3x(v0 = vl, 83~ > O. 
8vl 
Now consider 32(v2)= v2-  T(32,  v2 ,832 ,G,n ,k} / \  for 32 >0.  The partial derivative 
\ /t Ov 2 
of 32 with respect o v 2 satisfies: 
832 _ 1 8T  832 8T 1 -- 8T/Sv 2 > 0 (37) 
81) 2 832 8u 2 8u 2 1 q- 8T/832 
Finally, since fl is separable: 831 = 832 = 0. [] 
8v2 8vl 
Lemma 9. I f  conditions A and B hold, 3 is an undominated Type M symmetric 
Bayes- Nash equilibrium. 
Suppose all bidders except for bidder i are using the bidding function fl(vl,/)2)' 
The objective function for bidder i is given by: 
i 
En~[3  = (Utl - -M2n_k+l ) f2n_k+l (M2n_k+l )dM2n_k+ 1 
b 
f0 ~ / + (vii +v2- -2Mz . -k+2) f2 , -k+2(M2, -k+2)dMz,  k+2 
+ (v, 1 _ bi2)(F2,_ k+ 1(b2 ) i _ F2,_k+ 2(b~)) (38) 
where F,(x) =F] i l  ft. Bidder i chooses bil and b~, to maximize the objective function 
subject to b; 1 _> 0, b~ > 0. By lemma 1 l, the objective function is twice differentiable. 
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The first order necessary conditions are given by equations (39) and (40): 
c~E~ i 
-(v~, -b ' l ) f2,_k+,(b~,)=O; b'~ >0,  
< 0; b'~ = 0, (39) 
63 E ~ i 
- (v~ - b~)fE._k+z(b~) - (F2 ._k+ ~(b~) - F2. k+2(b~)) = 0; b~ > 0, 
~b~ 
<0;  b~ =0.  (40) 
The second derivatives are (omitting the superscript designating demander for 
notational ease): 
~2ETz 
- -  =(Vx - bt)f'2._k+~(b~)-f2, k+~(b~), (41) avf 
02E7~ 
8b t 8b 2 
82E~ 
~2E7c 
- = 0 ,  (42)  
8b28bl 
- -  = (v2 -- b2) f'2._ k + 2 (b2) -- f 2.-k +, (b2)" (43) 
Ob~ 
6q2Eg 6~2En 
The second order conditions are then: ~-  < 0, and ~7i~2-~b 2 < O. 
It follows from (39)that if f2.  k+~(b~)>0, then bx =Vl forvl _>0. Iff2._k+l(b~2)=O, 
then there can be more than one solution to (39) but any strategy is weakly 
dominated by b l = v l. Therefore bil = ill(V*1) = vi~ - Since fl being used by all players 
besides i and flis type M, we can derive the following equation: Prob (exactly l obser- 
/)- i  ~ i rations of fll(V~ i) < b~, exactly m + I observations of f12( 2 ) - b2) 
l!m[(n -- m - l)! 9@1, v2)dvl dv2 
(fT,;/ f; g(vl, v2)dvldV2 g(v 1, v2)dvldv21 . (44) 
The previous expression equals H(bi2, W2(biz), G, n, m, l), and it follows that: 
k+l(bi2)-F2,  k+ b' b i (b~,W2(b2),(c~W2(bi2)'] -~ (F:. - - 2( 2) ) / f2n -k+2(2)  = T\  \ ab2 J 
We can rewrite the first order condition in (40) for b~ > 0 as: 
=v2-  \ c~b~ / ,G,n,k . 
One solution to the last equation is to set b~ = fi2(v~): 
,G ,n ,k ) .  
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
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Recalling the fact that W(x) = fi2 ~(x), we see that: 
]~2(V2) = /)2 T( i ui 0fi2(/)~) n,k) (48) ' - -  fl2(/)2)' 2' ~V 2 ' G, . 
The first order conditions also imply that for b~ = 0: 
0 >_ 1412(0) - T fl2(v~), 2, ~ ,  G, •, k . (49) 
or2 
The last inequality holds with equality when W2(0 ) = v~. Now consider some 
o 
V 2 < V~. 
0~/ )  2 -- Z (O, / )~, (~- l ,a ,  vI, k ) .  (50 '  
\ \ 0b~ / 
By (40), be(v~) = flz(V~) = 0. 
C "" * ~//'" * 0flz(V~) "] F2" t(0)--F2n-k+2(0) t0 
ons laer / )2  ~ 1t l3 , /32 ,  - - - -  -, G, n, k = k + By Lemma 
\ o/)~ / f~~ 
f2._k+ 2(0) > 0. Also, as in lemma 5, F2._k+ ~(0) - f2n_k+ 2(0 ) = 0 ifn > k - 1 imply- 
( Ofl2(v) Gn'k) =Oi fn<k- l '  ing that v~ = 0 ifn > k - 1. As in lemma 6, T f12(~), ~ , - - ,  , 
0/)2 
andthereforefl2(O=~ifn<k-1. Finally, as in lemma 7, T(fi2(O),O,~,G,n,k)= 
\ (7/)2 / 
0, implying that fi(0) = 0, for n = k - 1. 
We have now shown that fi(/3~,/)2) is a solution to the first order conditions in 
(39) and (40). If the appropriate second order conditions hold, fl is a best response. 
The second order conditions are: 
02Elz 
--(v 1-bl)f'2" k+l (b l ) - - f2n_k+i (b l )<0 (51) 
0b~ z 
02Eg 
= (v2 - b2)f~.-k+ 2(b2) - f2 . -k+ z(b2) < 0. (52) Ob~ 
02E/r 
- -  < 0 is satisfied if bl = vl and f2 . -k+ l(b~) > 0. If fz ._k+ ~(b~) = 0, then many 
0b 2 02En 
solutions are possible but b~ = vl dominates any solution that has bx # v 1. ~ < 0 
is insured by condition A. To see this, consider: 0b2 
= E E ow2  OH i -/ ~2  ~/"  (53) 
q=2n-k+2 md;21+m=q 
Equation (53) implies that f'2n-k+ 2(b~) 
= E E \~W 2 0b22 q- + 2 + - -  (54) q=2n k+2 2l+m=q Obi? Ob~zOW2 Ob2 a i 0W2\ Ob2 / / 
and it is now apparent from equations (31), (52) and (54) that assumption A is 
02Enlfl 
satisfied if and only if - -  < 0 for all b 2 such that 0 <_ b2 <- O. (En i is strictly 
09~ 
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concave in b~ when all demanders besides bidder i use the strategy fl). We have now 
shown that fl is a best response to itself under conditions A and B. [] 
Lemma 10. I f  all n players besides bidder i use a bidding function that is type M and 
undominated, then f v(x) > 0 for 0 <_ x < B2(15 , 15). 
Proof: Recall that F~ equals Prob(At  least l bidders make 2 bids that are less 
than or equal to x, at least m + l bidders make at least I bid that is less than or 
equal to x). 
The probability that a randomly chosen bidder makes 2 bids that are less than 
or equal to x is given by: 
f f f /g(vl ,V2)dv2dvl.  (55) 
The term in (55) follows from the fact that if B is undominated, that v~ >_ v~ > 
B2(v ~, v~) (bidding an amount higher than one's valuation is dominated). The term 
is clearly strictly increasing in x if B is type M and undominated for x such that 
0 _< x < 15. Now consider the probability that a randomly chosen bidder makes at 
least one bid that is less than or equal to x. The probability equals: 
1 - g(v 1, v2)dv2dv 1. (56) 
B 2 a(v21vl =x) ' ~- t(vzlva =x) 
The last term results from the fact that underbidding on the higher valued unit is 
dominated by bidding an amount equal to the higher valuation and from the fact 
that v] >_ v~. This last equation is also strictly increasing in x for all x such that 
0 < x_< 15. It follows that Fv(x) is strictly increasing in x and that fv(x)> 0; 
0 _~ X _< B2(15 , 15). []  
Lemma 11. Enlfl is twice differentiable. 
Proof: By assumption 7~C 2. It follows that g(v~,v=)eC 1, since 9QJl,t)2) = 
2y(v2)@(Vz)(7(vl) -- y(v2))dy(vl). Since g(v~, v2)~C ~, ~g j'~g(Vl, vz)dv2dv~ is twice dif- 
ferentiable with respect o x and y and thus continuous in x and y. It follows that 
H(x, y, G, n, m, l), the product of twice differentiable functions, is twice differentiable 
with respect to x and y, and thus continuous in x and y. Therefore, F~(x)= 
2n 
Zq = v Z l , ra ;  2l + m = q H (x, fl- 1 (x), G, n, m, l) is twice differentiable in x. This implies that 
f~(x) is differentiable and continuous in x. 
En~(b~,b~2) is differentiable in b~ and b 2 because an anti-derivative of a 
continuous function is differentiable. Clearly therefore, the first derivatives are 
differentiable in b~l and b~. We have now shown that Ezr~(b~l, b~2)is twice differen- 
tiable. []  
References 
Forsythe, R., Isaac, M.: Demand revealing mechanisms for private good auctions. Res. in Exp. Econ. 
2, 45 61 (1982) 
Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive s aled tenders. J. Finance 16, 8-37 (1961) 
Weber, R.: Multiple-object auctions. In: Auctions, bidding and contracting, pp. 165-190. New York: 
New York University Press 1983 
